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The Boston
Harbor Cleanup
Paul F. Levy
Michael S. Connor
Boston Harbor earned a widespread reputation as "the dirtiest harbor in the nation "
during the 1988 presidential campaign. Well before that campaign began, though,
efforts were under way to reduce the amount ofpollution entering the harbor. The
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority was created in 1985 to undertake a massive
public works program — including construction of a 1.3 billion-gallon-per-day sewage
treatment plant and a sludge fertilizer processing plant— to end the decades-old prac-
tice of dumping sewage wastes into the ocean. The program will also cause water and
sewer charges to rise dramatically during a fifteen-year period.
The project has raised a host of environmental and public policy issues: How should
sludge by-products be disposed of or used by society? What is the proper placement of
the effluent outfallfor a sewage treatment plant of this magnitude discharging into
Massachusetts Bay? What is the appropriate level of treatment to apply to wastewater?
How can ratepayers be assured that their money is being spent on the highest environ-
mental priorities ?
This aricle represents the opinions and conclusions of the authors, not necessarily
those oftheMWRA.
Thanks to George Bush's 1988 presidential campaign advertisement, most people
know Boston Harbor only as one of the dirtiest in the country. What the politi-
cal ad failed to mention, however, are the remedial steps being taken to transform the
harbor into a useful and attractive resource for the Boston metropolitan area. In this
article, after explaining how the harbor became so polluted, we describe the current
cleanup program, analyze some of the most important issues that must be resolved in
the course of that program, and discuss the benefits of the different cleanup elements
to the environmental health of Boston Harbor and Massachusetts Bay.
Paul F. Levy, former executive director of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, is a visiting lecturer
in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Michael S. Connor
is director of environmental quality, Massachusetts Resources Authority.
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History
Boston Harbor and the major rivers leading into it— the Charles, Mystic, and Nepon-
set— have been used for the disposal of sewage wastes for hundreds of years. Look-
ing back to the colonial era, the historian Eliot Clarke observed:
The way in which sewers were built at this time was, apparently, this. When
some energetic householder on any street decided that a sewer was needed there,
he persuaded such of his neighbors as he could to join him in building a street
drain. Having obtained permission to open the street or perhaps neglected this
preliminary, they built such a structure as they thought necessary, on the shortest
line to tide-water. . . .
[By the 1820s] such changes have taken place in the contours of the city,
through operations for reclaiming and filling tidal areas bordering the old limits,
that, from being an easy site to sewer, Boston became one presenting many
obstacles to the construction of an efficient sewer system. . . .
As a consequence, the contents of the sewers were dammed back by the tide
during the greater part of each twelve hours. To prevent the salt water flowing
into them, many of them were provided with tide-gates, which closed as the sea
rose, and excluded it. These tide-gates also shut in the sewage, which accumu-
lated behind them along the whole length of the sewer, as in a cesspool; and,
there being no current, deposits, occurred. The sewers were, in general, inade-
quately ventilated, and the rise of sewage in them compressed the foul air which
they contained and tended to force it into the house connections. . . .
Although at about the time of low water the tide-gates opened and the sewage
escaped, the latter almost immediately met the incoming tide, and was brought
back by it, to form deposits upon the flats and shores about the city . . . Under
certain conditions of the atmosphere, especially on summer evenings, a well-
defined sewage odor would extend over the whole South and West Ends of the
city proper.
A great leap forward was made in the 1880s when construction of a massive col-
lection and transport system began. Its purpose was simple: to take wastewater away
from Boston and the communities along the Charles and Mystic rivers out to where it
would do no immediate harm, to Boston Harbor. From the time of its completion in
1904 until after World War II, the metropolitan area's wastewater "treatment" system
consisted of nothing more than this collection and transport system. Millions of gal-
lons per day of untreated sewerage were dumped into the harbor.
The system was improved following that war. In 1952, a primary treatment plant
was built on Nut Island in Quincy to handle wastewater flows from the southern por-
tion of the metropolitan area. In 1968, another primary treatment plant was con-
structed on Deer Island, near Winthrop, to handle the northern system. The Nut
Island and Deer Island treatment plants were designed to treat average daily flows of
112 million and 343 million gallons per day (mgd), respectively, and maximum peak
flows of 280 mgd and 848 mgd.
Problems soon arose. The treatment plants at Nut and Deer islands were owned
and operated by the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), a state agency subject
to the budgetary control of the state legislature. Also responsible for the metropolitan
area parks, roadways, skating rinks, and swimming pools, the MDC was never able
to attract sufficient legislative interest in its nonpark functions (that is, the sewer-
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works) to gamer sufficient funds to maintain and upgrade the new sewage treatment
plants. In short order the new plants became old plants subject to breakdowns, inade-
quate staffing, and poor performance. Plants that might have provided a reasonable
level of treatment on their construction were soon inadequate to handle even the ini-
tial flows for which they were designed, much less the growth that occurred in the
metropolitan area during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Furthermore, even when the
plants worked, they never eliminated the discharge of sludge into the harbor. Upon
its separation from the plant's influent, the sludge was simply held in storage tanks
pending discharge on the outgoing tides.
The next major development was the passage of the federal Clean Water Act in
1972. The act prescribed the use of secondary treatment for metropolitan areas such
as Boston, unless a waiver of that requirement was granted by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). The MDC applied for such a waiver, called a 301(h)
waiver after the section of the act in which it is set forth, arguing that the benefits of
secondary treatment were not worth its costs. Years of delay ensued, with inaction by
the EPA on the waiver request, a resubmittal by the state with more information,
more inaction by the EPA, and finally a denial of the waiver. In all, the waiver
process lasted from 1977 to 1984.
Meanwhile, the lawsuits began. There is the legendary story of William Golden,
the city solicitor for Quincy, who was jogging along Wollaston Beach through what
he at first thought was seaweed and jellyfish. Golden was horrified to find, on closer
examination, that the seaweed and jellyfish were actually untreated human feces. He
convinced the mayor of Quincy to sue the commonwealth in 1982 for violations of
state law with regard to wastewater discharges into Quincy Bay. In the interim, in
1983, the Conservation Law Foundation of New England started a federal court ac-
tion against both the commonwealth and the EPA, the former for violating the Clean
Water Act, the latter for not enforcing the act.
The federal case was held in abeyance while the state case proceeded. State Judge
Paul Garrity, finding substantial violations of state law, ordered a moratorium on
sewer hookups in the metropolitan area. He was immediately overruled by a higher
state court, but his message scared the legislature enough that in December 1984 it
created the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA), an independent
authority with the right to issue revenue bonds and raise rates to secure those bonds.
The MWRA was given the responsibility to take over and rebuild the MDC sewer
system.
Shortly after the MWRA came into being, the federal court case was revived.
This time, in an interesting legal maneuver, EPA was a plaintiff rather than a defen-
dant. The MWRA, as successor-in-interest to the MDC, found itself faced with a
federal court order to carry out the provisions of the Clean Water Act. The parties
and the court developed a detailed schedule in 1986 with more than one hundred
milestones over the next decade against which MWRA's compliance is monitored
monthly (see Figure 1).
The Plan
Thus began "the Boston Harbor Cleanup." The cleanup plan is relatively simple in
concept: build a new primary and secondary treatment plant to handle wastewater
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Figure 1
Project Milestone Chart
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flows through the year 2025; end the discharge of sludge into Boston Harbor with
some kind of landside disposal method; and resolve the problem of the combined
sewer overflows (CSOs). These are the relief valves on the old combined storm and
sanitary sewer system that release untreated sewage into the rivers and the harbor
whenever there is heavy rain.
While simple in concept, implementation is somewhat more complicated, and very
costly. The MWRA must:
• Build new primary and secondary treatment plants on Deer Island. The plants
must handle an average flow of 500 mgd, and a peak flow of almost 1.3 billion
gallons per day. The primary plant must be finished by 1995, the secondary by
1999 (see Figure 1).
• Maintain and improve the existing primary plant at Deer Island while the new
facility is built around it ("immediate upgrades").
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• Decommission the old Nut Island plant in Quincy, but first drill a five-mile
eleven-foot-diameter tunnel between Quincy and Winthrop, under Boston
Harbor, to connect the southern sewer system to the new treatment plant at
Deer Island.
• Drill a twenty-four-foot-diameter outfall tunnel for the effluent from the new
treatment plant out 9.5 miles into Massachusetts Bay.
• Construct a sludge processing plant to manufacture fertilizer pellets from the
sewage sludge by 1991.
• Move thousands of workers and tons of construction materials to Deer Island
by boat.
• Build a series of tunnels and conduits to connect eighty-eight CSOs along three
rivers and the harbor to the new treatment plant.
• Reduce groundwater infiltration and stormwater inflow to the system, which
account for more than half of the influent flow in dry weather.
• Raise nearly $7 billion from ratepayers in forty-three communities to pay for
all of the above, quintupling water and sewer bills over a fourteen-year period.
• Stay on schedule or be subject to federal sanctions, including daily fines of up
to $10,000 per violation of the Clean Water Act.
Issues to Be Resolved
The scientific and engineering issues surrounding this complex wastewater treatment
project have more than a passing academic interest. While virtually all the com-
ponents of the plan require a sound scientific and engineering basis, the decisions to
be made have serious financial implications for the ratepayers of the Boston metro-
politan area, and they also have important environmental consequences for the
harbor, Massachusetts Bay, and a number of landside locations. In the following
sections, we discuss some of these issues.
Sludge
The purpose of a sewage treatment plant is to separate the solids in the waste stream
from the water, purifying the latter while creating a residue of treated sludge. At the
new Deer Island treatment plant, like most others in the country, sludge will be
produced by two processes. The primary portion of the treatment plant will produce
sludge through a physical process, sedimentation, in forty-eight stacked settling
tanks. The secondary portion of the treatment plant will use a biological process, the
infusion of oxygen into a nutrient-rich suspension consisting of twelve aeration tanks
followed by seventy-two secondary clarifiers to separate still more sludge from the
plant's influent. Both the primary and secondary sludge will then travel to twenty
anaerobic digesters, where the volume of the sludge will be reduced by about 60 per-
cent, creating methane gas in the process.
Each day 1.6 million gallons (200 dry tons) of sludge will leave the anaerobic
digesters, requiring disposal in an environmentally sound manner. Basically, four
options exist for the disposal of this much sludge. The first, now illegal, is the
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method that was used for years by Boston, New York, and New Jersey: ocean dis-
posal. While some scientists claim that ocean disposal,2 if done properly, can achieve
good environmental results, Congress has deemed otherwise, and the practice was or-
dered stopped by 1991.
Option two is to dispose of the sludge by landfilling or land application. While
practical in some parts of the country (Omaha, Nebraska, and Tuscon, Arizona, have
large land application programs), the densely populated Northeast does not offer op-
portunities for this method of disposal. There is simply insufficient open space to
satisfy the demands of the next several decades.
Option three is incineration. Sludge is an organic material with significant heat
value. In theory, the combustion of sludge in an incinerator offers a payback in en-
ergy production and reduction of the volume of the material. In practice, though, in-
cineration presents some difficulties. First, siting an incinerator in a metropolitan area
is very difficult. Second, with ever stricter air quality standards, incinerators present
an operational risk over their lifetime. When air quality regulations change, the in-
cinerator may have to be shut down for an extended period to be retrofitted to meet
the new requirements. Also, malfunctioning or improperly operated equipment can
present real liability risks for the owner-operator of the facility. In Massachusetts two
sewerage districts, South Essex and Greater Lawrence, were forced to close down
their newly constructed sludge incinerators because of poor design and operations
problems. Finally, while reducing the volume of sludge by a factor of seven, a sludge
incinerator produces ash that must be disposed of in a landfill. Most of the toxics
present in the sludge when it leaves the treatment plant become concentrated in the
ash, making it a difficult material to handle and raising community concern over the
siting of the landfill.
Option four for sludge processing is recycling, or beneficial reuse. This is the
method chosen for the Boston Harbor cleanup. Two methods of reuse, composting
and heat drying, were considered for Boston. In a sludge compost facility, wet sludge
is dewatered on belt presses or in centrifuges. It is then mixed with a bulking agent
(wood chips), aerated until the pathogens in the sludge are killed off, separated from
the bulking agent, and sold as a soil conditioner. With the heat-drying process, the
sludge is dewatered as above, then sent through a rotary kiln oven, which drives off
excess water and kills the pathogens, producing a pellet or coffee-ground-type
product that can be used as a soil conditioner or fertilizer or as a base for commercial
fertilizer. Milorganite, produced by the Milwaukee sewer system for over sixty years,
is a heat-dried sludge product.
The MWRA chose to rely on heat drying for sludge processing. An initial five-
year contract was signed with New England Fertilizer Company, a private firm, to
design and operate the fertilizer plant and to market the pellets produced in it. The
agency chose to build the processing plant at the former General Dynamics shipyard
site in Quincy. It completed construction of this $87 million facility and was able to
shut off the sludge discharge lines leading to the harbor on December 24, 1991.
Meanwhile, though, a regulatory issue has reared its head. During the last weeks
of the Reagan administration, the EPA promulgated draft regulations that set such
strict limits on the use of sewage sludge that sludge in most parts of the country
could not be recycled as fertilizer. That the EPA might adopt such an approach, in the
face of overwhelming support on the part of environmentalists, sewage treatment dis-
tricts, and the public to recycle sludge into useful products, was extremely disturbing.
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The proposed regulations received widespread criticism at public hearings, with
comments focusing on the fact that they were entirely based on overly conservative
human and environmental health risk assessments without considering their impact
on beneficial reuse programs. The proposed regulations would have forced sewerage
agencies to abandon existing beneficial reuse programs to comply with the stringent
land application standards. Boston and New York, in the process of planning benefi-
cial reuse programs to end ocean dumping, would have had their options seriously
curtailed if the EPA regulations were adopted. Long-standing fertilizer production
operations — in Milwaukee, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Dayton, and elsewhere — would
have found that the years of experience they had accrued in recycling and the mil-
lions of dollars they had invested in fertilizer plants would have been put at risk by
the regulations.
While there is legitimate public concern about the recycling of sewage sludge be-
cause it contains trace amounts of toxic metals and organics from industrial and
household discharges into the sewer system, the problem is not intractable. Improve-
ments in industrial pretreatment, combined with strict enforcement of environmental
standards, have reduced and will continue to lower the levels of toxics in the waste
stream. Likewise, public education programs and household hazardous waste collec-
tion centers will reduce the level of household toxics going down the drain.
In Massachusetts, for example, we have witnessed a substantial reduction in the
level of toxics in wastewater. The MWRA has initiated a vigorous industrial pretreat-
ment and source reduction program. Thanks in part to this program and concomitant
actions at the federal level, the amount of heavy metals reaching the plant has
declined from nearly five thousand pounds per day in 1982 to almost one thousand
pounds per day in 1991 (see Figure 2).
There will always be some level of toxics in sewage sludge, and some level of
regulation is required to ensure that the concentration of these elements and the
public's exposure to them is kept well within safe limits. Research indicates, how-
ever, that the levels of toxics in sludge have not presented any health threat when
sludge products are used as fertilizer. 3
Fortunately, in response to the massive number of public comments received, the
EPA undertook a complete review of their proposed regulations. With help from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture and others, the EPA plans to issue regulations that
will encourage the beneficial reuse of sludge products throughout the country.
Outfall
Perhaps the most challenging construction on the project involves the excavation and
construction of the shaft, tunnel, and diffuser sections of the outfall. The effluent will
travel through a 450-foot dropshaft into a 24-foot diameter tunnel bored through bed-
rock and terminating in a diffuser section about nine miles offshore (see Figure 3).
The last 6,600 feet of the tunnel forms the diffuser, which consists of fifty-five verti-
cal riser shafts 2.5 feet in diameter. Effluent will be discharged in 100 feet of water
with a minimum initial dilution of about 180 during unstratified conditions ap-
proximately eight months of the year and 60 to 90 feet, depending on current speed
during the most stratified conditions in late summer. Construction of the tunnel began
in 1990. As of this date, the fifty-five vertical riser shafts have been completed, and
the- tunnel-boring machine has begun its long trek under the harbor.
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Figure 2
Metal Loadings — Total Discharge
Ironically, the location of the outfall diffusers for the planned secondary facility
is in the same general area proposed for a primary plant outfall in the original 301(h)
waiver application. The selection of the effluent outfall location was based on the
results of a $4 million data collection program, including physical, chemical, biologi-
cal, and geological oceanography. The effluent discharge area selected represents the
most favorable mix of outfall site characteristics. It is well within the large-scale
circulation patterns of Massachusetts Bay and therefore provides the most robust
long-term mixing. It is in an area of limited potential sediment accumulation and
thereby avoids problems associated with concentrating pollutants in nearby bottom
sediments.
It is located away from intensely utilized near-shore resources, avoiding the poten-
tial for disruption. Finally, the location for the diffuser can be reached by a gravity
flow effluent tunnel within a time frame consistent with the spirit of the court-
ordered target dates for treatment facility construction.
How far offshore should a sewage outfall be? Besides meeting state water quality
standards, the approved site is at the point where the marginal benefits (ambient dilu-
tion) increase only slightly, while the marginal costs rise steeply. The outfall location
has been criticized by local residents as being too short and by Cape Cod environ-
mentalists as being too long. Local communities are worried that the outfall
mightthreaten their beaches and shellfish beds. Cape Codders are concerned that the
proposed discharge poses a threat to marine mammal communities on Stellwagen
Bank off the Cape's western shore more than sixteen miles away from the proposed
discharge.
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Figure 3
Discharge of the New Outfall
MWRA measurements of waves and currents indicate that the outfall diffuser is
far enough offshore so that vigorous, variable currents will provide adequate dilu-
tion and avoid transport onshore toward beaches. Elevated concentrations of toxic
contaminants in the water column will not be found near Stellwagen Bank. Field
observations were used to calibrate and validate a numerical model of pollutant
transport. The model predicts that effluent reaching the North Shore communities
from the proposed diffuser site will be diluted 450-fold compared with the 50-fold
dilution available for effluent discharged from the current location. In addition, the
total amount of material that Boston will discharge to Massachusetts Bay will decline
tenfold with the completion of secondary treatment and the cessation of ocean sludge
discharge so that long-term chronic impacts on near-shore areas or Stellwagen Bank
should be minimal.
In short, the water discharged at the-outfall location should not have a detrimental
effect on that part of Massachusetts Bay or on any other part of the bay. However,
this is an issue that will be closely examined over the coming years. The MWRA
has in place a harbor and bay monitoring program to acquire base-line data on the
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condition of the receiving waters today. Those data will be compared with data col-
lected after the operation of the new treatment plant to demonstrate conclusively the
effect of the outfall on the bay. If, as expected, there are no adverse impacts, no fur-
ther treatment will be necessary. If there are adverse impacts, it may be necessary for
the MWRA to invest in more advanced forms of wastewater treatment at its facility
on Deer Island or elsewhere.
Level of Treatment
The centerpiece of the cleanup will be the construction of the second largest
wastewater treatment plant in the United States, with a capacity of 1,270 million
gallons per day. The effluent discharged from the new secondary treatment plant will
be dramatically cleaner than the effluent currently discharged from the Nut Island
and Deer Island plants. It will have biological oxygen demand (BOD) and total
suspended solids (TSS) concentrations of 22 and 21 mg/1 compared with the 140
mg/1 BOD and the 110 mg/1 of TSS from the existing poorly functioning primary
treatment plant at Deer Island. In short, the effluent will be clean enough that the
seawater at the end of the outfall will meet the classification of "swimmable."
Although the issue of Boston's level of sewage treatment has been considered by
the EPA and the federal court, there are likely to be further debates on this topic as
water and sewer rates rise in the metropolitan area, particularly, what are the benefits
of secondary treatment, and are they worth the $880 million expected cost of the
secondary treatment plant? Are there alternatives that are more cost-effective? Is
there a way to meet the water quality standards established under federal and state
law with less capital investment and/or lower operating costs? Since the MWRA is re-
quired by court order to build secondary treatment, we might view the debate as a
scheduling issue: How should the construction of the various components of the Bos-
ton Harbor cleanup be scheduled to maximize environmental benefits for the next dol-
lar spent? A similar issue is being raised in San Diego, where the city is being
required to spend $4.2 billion to build a new secondary treatment plant to replace its
current advanced primary system. Several marine scientists from the Scripps Institu-
tion of Oceanography have criticized the decision as a diversion of money from solv-
ing more pressing water quality problems.4
Discussion
How clean will Boston Harbor be as a result of this cleanup program? To answer that
question it is necessary to understand what the environmental problems are in Boston
Harbor and how the different harbor cleanup program components are likely to affect
those problems.
The major environmental impacts from sewage discharge are associated with the
four major components of the discharge: toxic contaminants, pathogens, nutrients,
and biological oxygen demand. Two of these problems are significant in Boston
Harbor:
• Beach and shellfish bed closures owing to bacteria
• High concentrations of toxic contaminants in fish and sediments.
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Because the shallow harbor is well flushed twice daily by large tidal flows, there
have not been the serious incidents of hypoxia or anoxia caused by nutrient and BOD
discharges that plague other estuarine waters, though some isolated portions in the
inner harbor do violate water quality standards.
Boston Harbor beaches are closed about 15 percent of the time during the sum-
mer, and all shellfish beds are either closed or restricted to master diggers in wet
weather. CSOs and storm drains discharge raw sewage to the harbor forty to eighty
times per year during and after rainfalls. Fecal coliform bacterial concentrations can
exceed 100,000 colony-forming units (CFUs) per 100 ml after heavy rains and persist
for four days at concentrations above the standard of 200 CFUs per 100 ml. 3
Boston Harbor received its moniker of "dirtiest harbor in the nation" on the basis
of data collected by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).6
The concentrations of toxic contaminants in fish tissue and sediments are uniformly
high in Boston Harbor, similar to such other major urban harbors as New York and
Baltimore. The major contaminants of concern are polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). PCB concentrations in MWRA dis-
charges have declined dramatically in the last decade, but PAHs have not. While Bos-
ton Harbor is fairly typical of urban estuaries as regards concentrations of toxic
contaminants, winter flounder from the harbor have a high incidence of liver
neoplasms.7 It is presumed that this incidence is caused by sediment contamination.
Table 1 summarizes the extent to which the different MWRA programs — immedi-
ate upgrade of treatment plants, cessation of sludge dumping, new treatment plant
facilities, new offshore outfall, and CSO facilities — will result in a cleaner harbor.
The largest reduction in the water concentration of toxic contaminants will result
from the construction of the outfall, because increased dilution will decrease the con-
centrations of toxic contaminants to about 10 percent of their concentrations in the
harbor. Secondary treatment and improved primary treatment incrementally reduce
toxic discharges by about the same amount, assuming that most toxic contaminants
are associated with particles. These contaminants will then be part of the sludge dis-
tribution network in such dilute concentrations that they present minimal risk to the
environment. Boston Harbor waters probably will meet water quality standards for
toxic contaminants after the completion of these projects, since these waters currently
meet most toxic standards most of the time. However, the contaminants remaining in
the sediments will continue to provide some risk to fish and shellfish living in these
sediments. To estimate the magnitude of this risk, MWRA is funding research to
measure the extent of particle transport in Boston Harbor and the flux of metals and
organics from contaminated sediments.
Beach and shellfish closures will be significantly improved — in relative order of
impact — by the (1) immediate upgrades at Deer Island, (2) CSO facilities, and (3)
cessation of sludge dumping. Improvements to Deer Island pumping and operations
have already reduced by about half the amount of untreated sewage entering the har-
bor. 8 Since CSOs have much more impact on the beaches and shellfish beds ringing
the harbor, and controlling CSOs would have a more dramatic impact on the visible
health of Boston Harbor than secondary treatment, many local citizens are advocating
acceleration of the CSO program. However, storm drains owned by the local muni-
cipalities account for a significant fraction of bacterial contamination, both from
urban runoff and illegal sanitary connections to the storm drains. Without control of
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Table 1
Cost and Benefits of Various Harbor Projects
Extent of Improvement
Project
Cost
(in $
Millions) Toxics Pathogens Nutrients / BOD
Immediate
Upgrades
Sludge
Primary
Secondary
Outfall
CSOs
Stormwater
33 <5%
650 30% less discharge
to the harbor
1 ,000 30% less discharge
to the harbor
880 30% less discharge
to the harbor
360 Same amount,
but concentration
will be 10 times
less in Mass Bay
because of dilution
2,200 About 5% less
discharge harbor-
wide, but larger
local impact near
overflow
? Less than 5%
improvement
harborwide
Untreated discharges
reduced by half
30% less to the
harbor, with major
benefit to Winthrop
No impact for normal
operations: major
improvements from
ending diversions
Little impact
Pathogen concen-
tration will be 10
times less and far
from beaches
One hundred-
fold improvement
near discharge; 25%
reduction in beach
closings harborwide
One hundred-
fold near discharges.
40% reduction in
beach closings
harborwide
Small improvement
to BOD
Improvement, but
current problem not
large
50% improvement,
but potential prob-
lem at outfall site
Some improvement
near discharge, but
may worsen algal
problems in far field
Oxygen declines will
be less, but the site
may be more sensi-
tive
10% improvement
near overflow
Negligible
Note: Impacts based on estimated load reductions.
these other sources of pollution, even complete elimination of CSO discharges will
not result in a clean harbor.
Dissolved oxygen concentrations should be sufficient in both Boston Harbor and
Massachusetts Bay with the new outfall to meet water quality standards regardless of
level of treatment. The long-term impact of increased coastal discharges of nutrients
on the kinds of phytoplankton growing in the region is more problematic. In the past
several years, coastal waters around the world from the Adriatic Sea to the Irish coast
to Peconic Bay have suffered from the outbreak of nuisance algal blooms. The as-
similative capacity of coastal waters for nutrient discharges is a challenging research
question.
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This cost-benefit comparison shows that improving current facilities, ending
sludge discharges, and using the new outfall have significant benefits for their costs.
On the other hand, stormwater control will mostly benefit localized areas at a propor-
tionally higher cost. The marginal benefits of full secondary treatment as compared
to CSO remediation or nutrient removal are more difficult to quantify and tend to
focus on different issues in different areas (for example, beach closures in the harbor
versus ecosystem effects in the bay). A more quantitative agenda of priorities for
these programs will depend on the final design of the CSO facilities and early results
from MWRA's ongoing monitoring of the harbor and the bay.
Despite uncertainty surrounding the issues discussed above and others that are certain
to arise in any environmental project as large and as complicated as the Boston Har-
bor cleanup, the MWRA has made significant progress and remained on schedule.
The project has already resulted in a cleaner harbor. MWRA spent more on capital
improvements in its first four years of existence than the MDC was permitted to
spend in the previous twenty years. A number of "immediate upgrade" projects
required to improve the interim performance of the treatment plant have been com-
pleted. These projects have already decreased the amount of grit and scum dis-
charged to the harbor by four thousand gallons per day and reduced the discharge of
coliform bacteria to the harbor. The decline in toxic discharges has resulted in winter
flounder in the harbor with dramatically reduced incidence of fin erosion and liver
disease. 9 In addition, the increased pumping capacity at Deer Island has reduced the
Figure 4
MWRA Household Water and Sewer Bills
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number and amount of CSO discharges dramatically, so that area beaches are the
cleanest they have been since measurements began in the 1930s. 10 But the largest im-
provement to the harbor occurred when sludge dumping ended in late 1991. A later
improvement will occur in 1995 with the completion of the outfall and the first phase
of plant construction.
Since the authority's inception in 1985, water and sewer ratepayers have seen their
average bills rise from about $140 a year to over $500 a year. That yearly price tag is
expected to reach $750 in current dollars by 1996 and $855 in current dollars by the
year 1998 (see Figure 4). Two thirds of the capital costs is determined by the court
schedule. Federal and state cost-sharing will contribute only a small percentage of
the total cost, so most of the costs of the Boston Harbor cleanup will be borne by the
ratepayers. Unless the federal government gets back into financially supporting the
Clean Water Act, ratepayers will face extraordinarily high sewerage rates. Given
these projected increases and the constraints of borrowing money in capital markets,
the MWRA will need to carefully weigh the expected benefits of various aspects of
the cleanup program to give the highest priority to investments that yield the greatest
water quality improvements. **•
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